



# EU activities for reducing impacts of freight train derailments

**DG MOVE B2 / ERA**



**2007 - 2009**

**Mandate to the Agency to issue a Recommendation to the Commission on the decision of RID to impose the use of mechanical derailment detectors (according to the article 6.2 and 6.4 of Agency Regulation)**

**The recommendation is supported by an Impact Assessment fulfilling the corresponding EC Guidelines (SEC(2005)791 and revised annex).**

**A consultation of Social Partners (CER, EIM, ETF) on the basis of the draft recommendation, according to the Article 4 of the Agency regulation.**

**Besides the mandatory consultation of the social partners, the NSAs have been invited to give their comments to the Agency about the draft recommendation and the impact assessment.**



# Agency reports and EC consultation planning

	Study on the Derailment Detection Device														
	2008				2009										
	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Mai	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov
Information on study progress delivered to the RIDCE meeting (21-23 Oct)															
Intermediate report (methodology, progress, preliminary results) delivered to DG TREN															
Presentation of the intermediate report to A21C and A9C meetings															
Final report on the Impact Assessment sent to DG TREN															
	EU Consultation process														
Draft recommendation sent to DG TREN				Draft											
Consultation of Social partners *															
Final recommendation sent to DG TREN						Final									
EC consultation, including committee meetings															
Commission document sent to the Secretary General of OTIF															
Discussion of RID 2011 provisions by RIDCE in the Autumn 2009 session															


\* According to Art 4 of Agency regulation and Commission Decision 98/500/EC



# Overall figures on EU derailment fatalities

## Fatalities by type of accident in the EU 25


Eurostat data: years 2004-2005



Accidents to person caused by RS in motion, 1976, 67%

## Fatalities from derailments

Sources: Eurostat (over 4 years) and ERA historical database (over 16 years)



**The derailments of DG wagons, with involvement of the dangerous goods, resulted in 3 fatalities over the last 16 years.**



### **Main sources for risk assessment methods :**

- ERA recommendation on Common Safety Methods,
- RID Guidelines on calculation of TDG risks by rail,
- Relevant reports on the risks of DG transport by rail in Switzerland,
- Risk assessment reports, methods from Netherland and France.



# Considered options

Option 0: The reference situation in EU-27 in 2008

Option 1: Voluntary use of DDD (Not quantified)

Options 2:

**2.A. :** The mandatory use of the DDD according to proposed RID 2011 provision

**2.B. :** Potential extension of application scope to all DG wagons

Option 3: The use of DDD on all freight wagons

→ Not assessed : Option 4: Prevention of derailments



### **Main sources for EU wide derailment data :**

- EUROSTAT data on freight traffic (including DG), accidents, population density,**
- ERA 'Historical accident database', including railway accidents data since 1990,**
- Collection of freight derailment data from National Safety Authorities and National Investigation Body networks.**





# Derailment risks assessment

## *Freight derailments lessons*

### The Agency received from NSA and NIB networks

- ✓ 251 filled-in questionnaires from **AT, DE, EE, ES, FI, HU, LT, LV, PL, SE, SK, UK and NO**
- ✓ Including some comprehensive surveys
  - IT reported a comprehensive list of 45 derailments over 7 years,
  - DK reported its synthesis from 235 derailments,
  - FR reported a comprehensive list of 160 derailments over 10 years
- ✓ In total, **information on 691 derailments**, with various level of details, were collected spanning a period **over more than 10 years.**





## Step 1:

### Likelihoods of freight derailment accidents for pre-defined categories

(Railway freight EU-27 – 2008: 815 Mln.Train.km giving 450 Bln.ton.km with 63 Bln.ton.km of Dangerous Goods freight)

#### Fatalities by type of accident in the EU 25

Eurostat data: years 2004-2005





# Derailment risks assessment

## *Derailment categories*

The following categories of derailments are considered in the event tree:

**Severe derailments** (with potential for wagon overturn):

- **Occuring immediately**
  - Involving DG wagon → **SD1**
  - Not involving DG wagon → **SD3**
- **Occuring some time after first undetected derailment:**
  - Involving DG wagon → **SD2**
  - Not involving DG wagon → **SD4**


**Non severe derailments** (with or without DG wagon):

- Detected by the DDD → **NSD1**
- Detected by the driver or other persons → **NSD2**



# Derailment risks assessment

## Derailment severities





# Present situation of EU 27 derailments

Each year, around 600 freight train derailments have to be considered, following these categories\*:

- |             |  |
|-------------|--|
| ❖ 198 (33%) | Severe** : <u>occurring immediately,</u>                   |
| ❖ 121 (20%) | Potential to end up severe : <u>not detected initially</u> |
| ❖ 281 (47%) | Not severe: <u>timely detected.</u>                        |

## Average derailments severity

- |                             |                       |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| ❖ Track kilometre damages   | (500 m to 5 km)       |
| ❖ Number of wagons impacted | (2,5 to 10 wagons)    |
| ❖ Hours of line closure     | (12 to 50 hours)      |
| ❖ Environment damages       | (145 to 2000 K euros) |

*\*according to the consultation of NSAs and NIBs networks ; \*\*with potential to lead to important human or financial impacts*



## Step 2:

**Severity assessment of freight derailments, including potential outcomes from the involvement of Dangerous Goods wagons**

## Step 3:

**Cost Benefit Analysis of the various options related to the potential use of the derailment detection device**

	Impacts on Safety (human and environment)	Impacts on Economics	Legal Impacts
Option 2a			
Option 2b			
Option 3			
Option 1			



# Applied Methodology

	Option 0				Societal, Environmental and Economical Risks						Damaged environment		
	Occurrence Frequency		Population	Victims		Railway system			Damaged tracks	Damaged wagons		Operation disruption	
	Quantified scenarii involving the dangerous good substance		Population within lethal area	Fatalities	Injuries	km / Y	Nb / Y	h / Y					
	Nb / Y		Nb	Nb / Y	Nb / Y								
Pool fire	0,872		0,046	4,03E-02	4,03E-01	see below	see below	see below					
VCE Gasoline	0,03		6,63	3,0E-08	5,01E-02								
BLEV	0,06		6,62	3,62E-08	3,62E-01								
VCE LPG	0,585		2,598	1,52E+00	1,52E+01								
Jet Fire LPG	0,005		0,346	1,68E-03	1,68E-02								
Chlorine (50mm breach)	0,005		38,975	1,94E-01	1,94E+00								
Ammonia (50mm breach)	0,008		1,444	1,16E-02	1,16E-01								
Fires Class 4	0,735		4,17	4,74E-01	4,74E+00								
Production of Environments	4,211		NQ	NQ	NQ								
Less significant (with or without DG substance involvement)*	16,628		0,046	7,68E-01	7,68E+00								
Class1 (with or without DG substance involvement)	2,077		NQ	NQ	NQ								
Class7 (with or without DG substance involvement)	0,103		NQ	NQ	NQ								
The consequences of those accidents have probably been overestimated													
NQ: Not Quantified													
	Nb / Y	ME / Y	SD1	Nb / Y	ME / Y	Nb / Y	ME / Y	km / Y	ME / Y	Nb / Y	ME / Y	h / Y	ME / Y
Severe DG wagon derailments with substance involvement**	19	46	SD1	3,0	4,6	30	6,1	6	2	117	3	584	9
			SD2'					0	0	0	0	0	0
			SD2					36	5	7	2	356	5
Severe DG wagon derailment without substance involvement	23	31	SD1					7	3	14	3	703	11
			SD2'					0	0	0	0	0	0
			SD2	1,0	1,5	2	0,4	43	6	86	2	428	6
Severe derailment of a normal freight wagon	277	335	SD3					86	34	1723	21	8613	129
			SD4					525	79	1049	13	5246	79
<b>Severe Derailments</b>	<b>319</b>	<b>435</b>											
Derailments mitigated by the Derailment detection device	0	0,0	NSD1	0	0	2	0,4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Detected by staff or public alarm	8	35,6	NSD2					211	6	704	4	3377	25
<b>Non severe derailments</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>36</b>											
<b>All considered derailments</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>471</b>		<b>4</b>	<b>6,1</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>943</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>3890</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>19307</b>	<b>204</b>

Scenarios involving Dangerous Goods

Railway system impacts

Summary of Derailments impacts



# Conclusions on studied options

	Impact on Safety (human and environment)	Impact on Economics	Legal Impact
Option 2a	Reduction of fatalities < 0.1 per year	- 5 M Euros (but some costs are not counted)	Disproportionate action TSIs impacts Only one DDD product
Option 2b	Reduction of fatalities < 1 per year	- 34 M Euros	Disproportionate action TSIs impacts Only one DDD product
Option 3	Reduction of fatalities < 1 per year	- 192 M Euros	Disproportionate in regards Safety aspects EN standards are required
Option 1 (voluntary use)	Reduction of fatalities << 1 per year ?	Sector should check its economical interest	Voluntary users have to respect the existing EU legal framework





## Safety (1/2)

The *DDD Provision* (Option 2a) does not significantly contribute to the reduction of the overall human risk level applicable to the EU railways  
-> less than 0.1 fatalities over 1500 fatalities per year

The main costs and benefits (All options) related to the freight train derailments are incurred by IMs and RUs and due to infrastructure and rolling stock damages as well as operation disruptions.

Automatic train stopping, without override function, might be inconsistent with the existing emergency procedures within the EU Member States, especially in tunnel contexts, and might induce new risks not sufficiently assessed and managed



## Safety (2/2)

The potential catastrophic consequences of derailments involving dangerous substances are most likely to arise in specific vulnerable locations.

The EU member states have the possibility to use the Article 1.4.b) of the Directive 2008/68/EC and the Article 1.9 of its RID annex for managing local and time dependent risks with local solutions.

A definition of risk acceptance criteria, common for all inland transport modes, adapted to the particular risks of dangerous goods, might facilitate the implementation of local solutions, commonly accepted by the concerned parties, and without discrimination of a given transport mode



## Interoperability

The *DDD Provision* might require several amendments of the existing Technical Specifications of Interoperability of the trans-European conventional rail relating to the subsystem "Rolling stock – Freight wagons" and to the subsystem "Traffic Operation and Management"

The implementation (including application of existing TSIs) of the *DDD Provision* would induce costs to the sector which might not be compensated by the expected safety benefits



# 2009 reports



European Railway Agency

Final Report

Impact Assessment on the use of  
Derailment Detection Devices in the EU Railway

Reference:	ERA/REP/03-2009/SAF	Document type:	Public
Version:	1.0		
Date:	07 / 05 / 2009		

	Prepared by	Reviewed by	App
Name	Leading author: Emmanuel Ruffin Contributing authors: Christophe Cassir Torben Holvad*	Jean-Charles Pichant Airy Magnien*	And
Position	Safety Unit Project Officers *Economic Unit Advisor	Head of Interoperability Unit *Head of Economic Evaluation Unit	Head
Date & Signature	Signed	Signed	

File : Era-Rep-03-2009-Saf.doc



European Railway Agency

Safety Unit



European Railway Agency

Safety Unit

Recommendation on the provision  
proposed by the RID Committee of Experts requiring  
the use of Derailment Detection Devices  
(ERA/REC/01-2009/SAF)

Reference: ERA/REC/01-2009/SAF  
Version: 1.0  
Date: 11/05/2009  
Status: Final  
Author: Safety Unit  
ERA 1.0

Page 14

Information to the Commission  
about the consultations undertaken by the Agency  
draft Recommendation (ERA/REC/01-2009/SAF)  
and its supporting draft impact assessment

ERA/INF01-2009/SAF  
1.0  
©10/05/2009  
Final  
Safety Unit

Page 1/11



**2009 - 2012**

## RISC and Inland TDG Committee agreed on the following actions

“A study on derailment preventive measures (which would lead to better impact assessment results).”

“A market research on products that meet the DDD provision in its current version (EDT 101 type) and/or in the version modified.”

“A study on the impact of false alarms and the level of reliability that should be imposed for DDD (EDT 101 type).”

“A study on the impact of automatic braking and false alarms in tunnels/bridges .”

## The Workshop of RISC and Inland TDG Committee agreed on the following actions in September 2009

“A study on the comparison of the decision making process in the context of the safety/interoperability directives on one side, and in the context of the RID committee on the other side. This study should also look at the scope of both instruments, as well as at the competences of the RISC/TDG Committees and of the RID Committee.”

“A study on the feasibility of harmonizing risk acceptability...of dangerous goods accident... (national level, EU level, RID versus safety directive).”

“Voluntary experiments at national level.”



# DNV / ERA / EC Work organisation

“A study on derailment **preventive measures** (which would lead to better impact assessment results).”

“A **market research on products** that meet the DDD provision in its current version (EDT 101 type) and/or in the version modified.”

“A study on the impact of **false alarms** and the level of **reliability** that should be imposed for DDD (EDT 101 type).”

“A study on the impact of **automatic braking** and false alarms in **tunnels/bridges** .”

“Voluntary **experiments at national level**.”

“A study on the **comparison of the decision making process** in the context of the safety/interoperability directives on one side, and in the context of the RID committee on the other side. This study should also look at the **scope** of both instruments, as well as at the **competences** of the RISC/TDG Committees and of the RID Committee.”

“A study on the **feasibility of harmonizing risk acceptability**...of dangerous goods accident... (national level, EU level, RID versus safety directive).”

Det  
Norske  
Veritas

ERA

ERA

Member States

European  
Commission





# Planning

		2010					2011						2012												
		Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Mai	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	Mai	Jun	
DNV Study	Kick off Meeting	Orange																							
	Part A - State of play	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green																
	Workshop								Orange																
	Part B - Promising measures (short & medium term)								Green	Green	Green	Green													
	Workshop														Orange										
ERA	Impact Assessment (promising measures)								Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue	Blue							
	ERA Draft recommendation																	Blue							
	Consultation																		Grey						
	ERA Final recommendation																				Final				
EU	Commitology																						Dark Blue	Dark Blue	Dark Blue






## Scope of Det Norske Veritas study

“A study on derailment **preventive measures** (which would lead to better impact assessment results).”

“A **market research on products** that meet the DDD provision in its current version (EDT 101 type) and/or in the version modified.”

Det  
Norske  
Veritas  
(1)





Det Norske Veritas

Assessment of freight train  
derailment risk reduction  
measures:  
Part A Final Report

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/01  
Rev: 01

21 July 2011



Contains main findings on:

- Existing Measures (P & M)
- Market for Technical Measures
- Functional and performance assessment
- New technologies and approaches



Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures:

### A1 – Existing measures

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/02  
Rev: 02

18 April 2011



-> Survey of Infrastructure managers, Railway undertakings, accident reports, network statements, literature and internet search

-> 47 preventive measures

-> 13 mitigating measures



Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures:

### A2 – Markets for Technical Measures

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/03  
Rev: 02

12 April 2011



- > Products' catalogues,
- > Internet,
- > Interview with suppliers
  
- > Market size
- > Market share
- > Market maturity
- > Price evolutions
  
- > Mechanical DDD considered as a growing market
- > 2000 wagons equipped in 2011 world-wide



Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures:

### A3 – Functional and Performance Assessment

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/04  
Rev: 02

12 April 2011



- > Use of relevant data from A1 and A2,
- > Interview with IMs and RUs
- > What measure they use and why?
- > Effectiveness? Reliability? Experience? LCC?
- > Plans to introduce additional measures?
- > some cases supported by in-service data
- > in general users are not very well informed on actual performance



Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction

measures:

### A4 – New Technologies and Approaches

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/05  
Rev: 02

19 April 2011



- > Interview with IMs and RUs
- > Review of published research/papers on new topics & technology
- > Consolidation of information on potential risk reduction
- > Consideration of future market /logistic trends
- > Electronically controlled pneumatic Brakes
- > Improved vehicle design
- > Use of on-board condition monitoring
- > New brake blocks
- > Use of acoustic and imaging technology
- > Active operation monitoring and 'in operation' safety data communication





Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures: Part B Final Report

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/09  
Rev: 02

20 October 2011



Det Norske Veritas

### Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures: B1 - Derailment Risk Models

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/09  
Rev: 02

27 June 2011



Det Norske Veritas

### Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures: B2 - Risk model and effectiveness of the

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/09  
Rev: 02

23 July 2011

Det Norske Veritas

### Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures: Annex 1 to B2 - Risk model and potential effectiveness of measures (incident studies)

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/09  
Rev: 02

26 July 2011



Det Norske Veritas

### Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures: B3 - Top ten ranking of safety measures

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/09  
Rev: 02

23 September 2011





Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures:

### Part B Final Report

Report for European Railway Agency

Report No: BA000777/09

Rev: 02

20 October 2011



Contains an overview of:

- Derailment risk models
- Risk model and potential effectiveness of measures
- Accidents analyses
- Top ten ranking of safety measures



Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures:

### B1 – Derailment Risk Models

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/06  
Rev: 02

27 June 2011



- > Review of derailment accidents
- > Cause-consequence of derailments
- > Influence of existing measures
- > Barrier models
- > Fault-tree model + combination of causes
- > Event-tree model
  
- > Confirmation of validity of ERA 2009 model



Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction measures:

Annex 1 to B2 – Risk model  
and potential effectiveness of  
measures (accident analysis)

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/07/A1  
Rev: 00

08 July 2011



-> Analysis of 201 accidents  
(in addition to accident  
analysed in 2009)

-> Derailment causes

-> Combined causes



Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction

measures:

B2 – Risk model and potential  
effectiveness of measures

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/07  
Rev: 02

21 July 2011



- > Populating risk model with data
- > Development of Impact model  
(Human-Railway system-Environment)
  
- > Use of the model
- > Benchmarking/Checking validity of the  
model approach
  
- > Maximum risk reduction potential,  
with:
  - New measures
  - Extended/Adapted  
use of existing measures
  
- > Confirmation of validity of ERA 2009  
results



Det Norske Veritas

## Assessment of freight train derailment risk reduction

measures:

### B3 – Top ten ranking of safety measures

Report for European Railway Agency  
Report No: BA000777/08  
Rev: 03

21 September 2011



- > Measure identification
- > Type of measure (technical, procedural, organisational)
- > Optimal application scope
  
- > Risk reduction quantification
- > Cost-Benefit assessment
- > Identification of non-quantified advantages and drawbacks
  
- > Top ten ranking
  - Prevention
    - WLID/WIM, PRC, BHD, BAM, WPD, SWD
  - Mitigation
    - DDD (10<sup>th</sup>) and not cost effective
    - DDD has a drawback confirmed
  - Organisation
    - Awareness programme on rolling stock maintenance (focussed on main causes – increased supervision)
    - Track geometry (increased supervision)



## Parties involved in DNV's study *(summarized in section 3.1 of ERA 2012 report)*

. Information was received from the following States and organisations:

- Railway undertakings from 13 EU MS, and from Norway, Switzerland and USA,
- Infrastructure Managers from 15 EU MS, and from Norway, Switzerland and USA,
- 12 suppliers on 31 technological products used for preventing or mitigating derailments,
- CER, UIP and UNIFE,
- Research organisations and internet, as well as DNV's team knowledge.



## DNV Study – Key conclusions

- Confirmed ERA 2009 report's conclusions
  - > Mechanical DDD not cost-effective
  - > Automatic braking can trigger a derailment
  
- Showed that
  - more than one mechanical DDD exists on the market
  - But, many other technical measures than DDDs are more effective and are efficient
  
- (mainly) Studied technical measures
- Organisation measures should also be considered





# ERA 2012 report scope

“A study on derailment **preventive measures** (which would lead to better impact assessment results).”

-> including also non technical measures (SMS – EVIC) not covered by DNV + long term measures

“A market research on products that meet the DDD provision in its current version (EDT 101 type) and/or in the version modified.”

“A study on the impact of **false alarms** and the level of **reliability** that should be imposed for DDD (**EDT 101 type**).”

“A study on the impact of **automatic braking** and false alarms in **tunnels/bridges** .

ERA 2012  
report


Sections  
4.1, 4.4 &  
7

Section 6.1

Section 6.1




# ERA 2012 report process (inputs)





# ERA 2012 report process (outputs)





## *The Agency*

- *Checked DNV's methodology,*
  - *Checked inputs and re-assessed DNV's findings,*
  - *Shared and discussed DNV's reports in two workshops (May 2011 and September 2011):*
    - *Representatives from RISC, TDG/EC, NSA, NIB, RID experts, CEFIC, CER, EIM, ERFA, UIC, UIP, UIRR, UNIFE were invited.*
  - *Received detailed comments from:*
    - *DK NSA, FI NSA, IT NSA, FR NIB, BE ECM, CER, CH FOT, RID WG TVT, UIC, Rail Cargo Austria, Knorr-Bremse*
- > *General agreement on the high quality of the DNV's Study***



## *The Agency*

- *Used relevant results from the DNV's study, including answers to detailed comment received from interested parties,*
- *Complemented with other relevant inputs*
- *Answered to the questions raised in 2009 by the RISC and TDG EC Committee (1<sup>st</sup> Slide) – in the light of the new findings*
- *Put in perspective short/medium/long term measures*
- *Recommended on the most efficient risk reduction actions*
- *Sent its draft report for consultation to representative associations*



# Consultation on ERA's report

*Consultation from 20/01/2012 to 06/02/2012 of representative associations:*

*- CER, EIM, ERFA, UIC, UIP, UIRR and UNIFE*

*- Two answers: UIRR, CER*

*-> **General agreement on Agency's conclusions**  
including, detailed comments which support / do not  
affect the general conclusions*



# ERA 2012 conclusions on derailment detection

## Mechanical detectors (M1-a)

- 1) Other measures are more effective,**
  - 2) M1-a type do not report a clear signal to the driver**
  - 3) M1-a type can trigger a derailment in case of false alarms**
  - 4) M1-a type can be used if APIS requirements fulfilled**
- > It means under the responsibility of the applicant if authorisation granted by the competent authority.**
- > Note in RID 7.1.1 section**



# ERA 2012 conclusions on derailment detection

**The Agency confirmed its 2009 recommendation to the European Commission**

**RID 2013 adopted a note in section 7.1.1 explaining the (voluntary) conditions for using derailment detections**





# ERA 2012 conclusions on derailment detection

## Electronic detectors (M1-b)

- 1) M1-b type does not exist on the market (2012)
- 2) M1-b type would give a clear signal to the driver
- 3) M1-b type could be compatible with TSIs
- 4) M1-b type potential efficiency to be considered in the framework of telematics developments

**ERA agreed to re-assess this option in the light of technical and scientific progress.**



## Priority to SMS and maintenance systems

- 1. Priority is to make safety management system and maintenance system working better*
- 2. More effective and efficient measures than the derailment detection are immediately practicable*
- 3. Derailment detection should be used on voluntary basis if requirements for vehicle autorisation are fulfilled*



## Voluntary approach for (additional) technical measures

- 1. The Agency recommends a voluntary approach concerning four (4) technical measures assessed as being efficient at EU level (WLID/WIM, PRC, BHD, BAM).*
- 2. RUs & IMs must target efficient measures, as a result of  
a) the implementation of their SMS,  
b) taking into account company and country specific situations*
- 3. Priority is to make safety management system and maintenance system working better*



## Longer term measures

### **1. *Improving knowledge on derailments combined causes***

- For example:
- Wheel/Rail interactions
  - Intervention limits concerning track quality

### **2. *Prepare future developments in IT systems for safety data monitoring and data networking***

- For example:
- Harmonised real-time monitoring (quality of wagon/track/train composition)
  - Harmonised safety-data exchanges (RUs, IMs & ECMs)

### **3. *Study potential changes in freight fleet design (combined add-values for logistics and safety improvements)***

- For example:
- Increased use of central-couplings
  - Wagons fitted with power supply and data transmission ...



# Status of the mandate after 2011 DNV reports and 2012 ERA's report

- ✓ “A study on derailment preventive measures (which would lead to better impact assessment results).”
- ✓ “A market research on products that meet the DDD provision in its current version (EDT 101 type) and/or in the version modified.”
- ✓ “A study on the impact of false alarms and the level of reliability that should be imposed for DDD (EDT 101 type).”
- ✓ “A study on the impact of automatic braking and false alarms in tunnels/bridges .”

# Status of the mandate after 2012 ERA's report

“A study on the comparison of the decision making process in the context of the safety/interoperability directives on one side, and in the context of the RID committee on the other side. This study should also look at the scope of both instruments, as well as at the competences of the RISC/TDG Committees and of the RID Committee.”

“A study on the feasibility of harmonizing risk acceptability...of dangerous goods accident... (national level, EU level, RID versus safety directive).”

“Voluntary experiments at national level.”

# 2011 – 2014 EC Studies

# Study on interactions between EU legislation and RID

“A study on the comparison of the decision making process in the context of the safety/interoperability directives on one side, and in the context of the RID committee on the other side. This study should also look at the scope of both instruments, as well as at the competences of the RISC/TDG Committees and of the RID Committee.”





# Study on interactions between EU legislation and RID

Selected consultant: SMITHERS / PIRA

Report delivered on: March 2013

Report accessible at :  
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/studies/doc/2013-03-10-rail-dangerous-goods.pdf>

Main conclusions from Smithers and Pira:

-> Cooperation between ERA and RID Committee is crucial on certain topics

Main concerned topics :

-> Emergency planning

-> Railway operation (e.g. ECMs roles and responsibility)

-> Wagon construction

-> Reporting of accidents and statistics

-> Terminology

-> Telematics

-> Impact assessment

-> Multi-modal harmonisation

# Use of the study results by DG MOVE / OTIF / ERA

**Administrative Arrangement : point 12 establishes the principles for management of TDG interfaces:**

- a) Allocation of responsibilities to the railway stakeholders**
- b) Railway operations**
- c) Wagon construction**
- d) Reporting of accidents and statistics**
- e) Emergency planning**
- f) Telematics applications**
- g) Terminology**
- h) Risk evaluation and assessment methods**
- i) Any other relevant issues.**



# Study on harmonised risk acceptability

“A study on the feasibility of harmonizing risk acceptability...of dangerous goods accident... (national level, EU level, RID versus safety directive).”



# Study on harmonised risk acceptability

Selected consultant: DNV

Report delivered on: March 2014  
*(draft presented in an EC Workshop in February 2014)*

Report accessible at :  
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/studies/doc/2014-03-25-dangerous-goods.pdf>

## Policy Options for Network Risk Assessment

---

- A. A new directive on DG safety, and a regulation requiring MS to calculate and report their risk levels in all DG transport modes, equivalent to that currently in place for railways.
- B. Inclusion of DG risks in the existing policy on road safety and legislation on rail safety. Inland waterways could be included by adopting a new policy for all modes of DG transport.
- C. Implementation of the network risk assessment as a research study led by the Commission, using voluntary assistance from MS.

Preferred option is A

## Policy Options for Local Risk Assessment

---

- A. A new directive on DG safety, and a regulation requiring MS to calculate and report their risk levels in all DG transport modes, equivalent to that currently in place for railways.
- B. Inclusion of DG risks in the existing CSM legislation for railways and development of equivalent CSM for road and inland waterways.
- C. Inclusion of a requirement for a local risk assessment of DG restrictions in the existing Directive on the inland transport of dangerous goods.
- D. Amendment of the guidelines for calculation of risks under Chapter 1.9 of ADR/RID/ADN to follow the harmonised approach.
- E. Promotion of the local risk assessment approach through an independent guideline document, produced by the Commission, in consultation with MS.

Preferred option is A

## Recommended Changes in EU Policy and Legislation

---

- A new directive on DG safety in all transport modes. This would include road, rail and inland waterways. It would state the harmonised RAC and explain how they are intended to improve safety. Where MS intend to apply restrictions on TDG, it would require them to make a risk assessment covering the complete scope of changes in TDG that may result, and supply the results to the Commission for use in the EU level network risk assessment.
- Adjustment of the Commission's existing policy on road safety to include DG risks explicitly.
- Adjustment of the CSTs for rail safety to include DG risks explicitly.



## Recommended Organisational Steps

---

- Analyse the data on DG transport activity and incidents that has been collected under existing legislation, in order to produce accident frequencies suitable for the network and local risk assessments.
- Develop a suitable methodology for the network and local risk assessments.
- Conduct an initial network risk assessment as a research study, using voluntary assistance from MS.
- Develop a process for setting the specific values of the harmonised RAC.
- Communicate with MS the priorities for risk reduction that are selected in the network risk assessment, and receive the results of local risk assessments of DG transport restrictions.
- Review periodically the harmonised RAC, in the light of practical changes to DG transport restrictions that they support, and adjust the RAC if necessary.

# Status of the mandate after EC's Studies

“A study on the comparison of the decision making process in the context of the safety/interoperability directives on one side, and in the context of the RID committee on the other side. This study should also look at the scope of both instruments, as well as at the competences of the RISC/TDG Committees and of the RID Committee.”

“A study on the feasibility of harmonizing risk acceptability...of dangerous goods accident... (national level, EU level, RID versus safety directive).”

“Voluntary experiments at national level.”



# Further steps: Roadmap on risk management

(see INF 16 – UNECE-OTIF Joint Meeting – September 2014)


## Objectives:

- To facilitate the exchange of technical information in a structured and well scheduled manner,
- To facilitate the coordination of technical developments by EU, UNECE and OTIF, where relevant,
- To facilitate the development of common practices and guidance documents.”



# Further steps: Roadmap on risk management

## 11 Workshops over 3 years





# Further steps: Roadmap on risk management

ERA further steps -> Roadmap on Risk Management  
(see INF 16 – UNECE-OTIF Joint Meeting – September 2014)

“The Agency believes that by the end of 2017 the proposed organization may eventually lead to further recommendations (further technical work or proposals for legislative developments) to the relevant Regulatory Committees in regards the use of risk-based approach for a better harmonization of the management of risks in the inland transport of dangerous goods.”



# 2011 – 2020

## Other ERA, EC or Sector activities



# Other activities having an impact on the control of derailment risks

- > Safety Management Systems (SMS) dissemination
- > Entities in Charge of Maintenance (ECM)
- > European Visual Inspection Catalogue (EVIC)
- > European Wheelset Traceability (EWT)
  
- > D-Rail research project (October 2011 – September 2014)
  
- > Shift 2 Rail



# Safety Management Systems (SMS)

The Agency developed tools to support the RUs and the IMs

The SMS Wheel



The SMS website



Guidance



- › The Agency organised workshops and trainings inside and outside the EU providing expertise on SMS
- › Safety Regulatory Framework
- › Design, implementation and monitoring of SMS
- › Safety Culture
- › Risk management & Change management









# Maintenance – ECM – EVIC

## NUMBER of ECM certificates ( May 2012-May 2014)



Number of ECM certificates in EU Member States

## Objectives:

Long term and sustainable reduction of derailment impacts

Start: October 2011

End: September 2014

Final conference: Stockholm – 12<sup>th</sup> November 2014

Organised by:

**UIC – Trafikverket – Newcastle University**

Shift to rail Master plan (adopted by the Governing board 24.09.14) :

“identifying and developing innovative solutions to make the carriage of dangerous goods by rail the obvious number one choice is also essential.”

Link:

<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/rail/doc/2014-09-24-draft-shift2rail-master-plan.pdf>



Thank you for your attention

