Rid: 2nd Session of the RID Committee of Experts’ standing working group
(Copenhagen, 18 to 22 November 2013)

Subject: Report according to RID 1.8.5 of events that occurred on 11 May 2012 in Godinne (Belgium) during the transport of dangerous goods – Follow-up

Transmitted by Belgium

Summary

Executive summary: Further information concerning the occurrence in Godinne (11 May 2012).

Related document: OTIF/RID/CE/GPT/2012/1

Decision to be taken: None (for information only)

Introduction

1. At the first session of the RID Committee of Experts’ standing working group in November 2012 in Riga, Belgium submitted document OTIF/RID/CE/GPT/2012/1 concerning the report according to RID 1.8.5 of events that occurred on 11 May 2012 in Godinne (see annex).

2. The investigation report is now available via the following website:
   http://www.mobilit.belgium.be/fr/traficferroviaire/organisme_enquete/cloturees/

3. This informal document summarizes the causes of the event. The aim is also to point out recommendation No. 6 of the report dealing with trains carrying dangerous goods.
Reminder of the facts

4. On Friday 11 May 2012 at 11h32 on line 154, freight train E44785 had a rear-end collision with freight train EE44883, which was stationary in Godinne railway station.

The damage was very significant.

At the rear of the train that was hit, there were four tank-wagons with dangerous goods. Two of these tank-wagons were severely damaged. No leak of dangerous goods occurred, but a safety perimeter was installed and maintained for 5 days (mass evacuation of people).

Causes of the accident

5. The accident was caused by a signal failure. The warning signal b779 was green (instead of 2-yellow) followed by the red signal B779.

This is the normal situation:

\[ \text{b779} \quad \text{B779} \]

The day of the accident, signal b779 was green:

6. Because of the topology of the track, the driver was unable to see the red signal B779 or the rear of the preceding train. When the driver realized that a collision was going to occur, it was too late to stop. The speed of the train was about 85 km/h.
Primary cause:

7. The signal failure was caused by excess voltage being applied to the signal command circuit by damaged power cable on a traction unit.

Recommendation No. 6 in the investigation report

8. Recommendation n°6 reads as follows:

    The NSA (BE) should ensure that a study on the composition of trains be made by the railway sector stakeholders, including the economic, organizational and operational aspects in the context of competition between European railway undertakings and between the modes.

9. Following this recommendation, NSA BE invited various stakeholders to address this issue; namely, Infrabel (Infrastructure Manager in Belgium), SNCB Logistics (railway undertaking involved in the accident), Essenscia (Federation of Belgian Chemical Industries) and UIC.

    This study is currently ongoing.

Conclusions

10. Following this accident and the accident at Wetteren on 4 May 2013 (see informal document INF.6), initiatives were set up (or highlighted) in Belgium, in particular the wish to establish risk maps so that various routes could be compared.

11. During the workshop on risk evaluation and assessment in October in Valenciennes, in the context of the inland transport of dangerous goods, the risk analysis methodology developed by the Flemish region was presented.

12. Discussions concerning the most appropriate legal basis and the practical modalities for the management of these risk analysis are still ongoing.
Summary

1. On 11 May 2011 in Godinne (Belgium), a freight train collided (at about 90 km/h) with another freight train, which was stationary. The train that was hit was composed of 28 wagons, 4 of which were carrying dangerous goods (22nd, 23rd, 24th and 28th wagons). The 27th wagon was a flat wagon loaded with metal girders. The 26th wagon was an empty, uncleaned L10BH tank which had contained a non RID product.

2. Following the impact:
   – the 28th wagon (last tank-wagon containing carbon disulphide 336/1131) was subject to a violent impact. It derailed, but did not leak. The tank was emptied before being righted;
   – the 26th wagon (tank-wagon not containing dangerous goods) derailed and the L10BH tank was penetrated by the steel girders from the 27th wagon;
   – the 24th wagon (tank-wagon containing butyl acrylates, stabilized 39/2348) was subject to a less violent impact. It derailed, but did not leak. The tank was emptied before the area was evacuated.
3. Consequences of the occurrence:

- A safety perimeter was set up (~350 metres) leading to the evacuation of dwellings, two schools, a rest home and a care home for 5 days. In total, more than 900 people had to be evacuated.

- Lines closed for 10 days (dangerous products present at the site for 5 days).

- Difficulties encountered when the contents of the tanks were transferred (instability of the wagons, difficult access due to the wagons and girders being entangled).
Annexe 3: photos de l’accident de Godinne